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In the Lisbon agenda, in March 2002, the European Union recognized
market integration – both within, and across its member countries – as a
prerequisite for sustained economic growth. In this paperwe quantify the
expenditure reduction that results from one such interconnection: the
case of the Italian electricity spot market. Speciﬁcally, our study has two
aims. The ﬁrst one is to characterize the objective function of a pivotal
electricity generator in a semi-regulated environment with a mixed
ownership structure: the Italian treasury and private investors. The
second one is to estimate the expenditure reduction in the spot marketafter congestion removal— in the formof lower electricitypricesprimarily
due to a more efﬁcient utilization of existing generation capacity.
The Italian electricity market is a good example for understanding
the beneﬁts of improvedmarket interconnection. At present, there is a
hot debate in Italy regarding infrastructural enhancements, primary
among which is the discussion on the electricity transmission
network. While the proponents of such venture argue that an
improved network would reduce prices substantially, its opponents
claim that it would lead to environmental damages without bringing
about any signiﬁcant beneﬁts to end-users. To our knowledge, there is
no scientiﬁc attempt on either side to quantify either costs or beneﬁts.
Therefore, our study can be viewed as partially bridging this gap by
estimating the beneﬁts of interconnection in the spot market.
Moreover, the structure of the Italian electricity spot market is
particularly suitable for addressing the question at hand. Currently,
the market is divided into several zones, with the amount of
electricity that can ﬂow across zones being limited due to insufﬁcient
transmission capacity. Generators, with varying degrees of efﬁciency
and capacity, are located all over the country. While a no-arbitrage
condition ensures that the market clearing price is the same across all
zones when the transmission capacity is not fully saturated, zonal
prices differ when the transmission constraint is binding. One way to
eliminate this price difference is to invest in inter-zonal transmission
capacity, so that generators can reallocate production among more
efﬁcient units, thereby reducing overall costs. Therefore, the question
3 The market structure described here is relevant for the sample period (May 2004).
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in the expenditure incurred by the Italian economy on the electricity
spot market, after sufﬁcient inter-zonal transmission capacity is
installed such that the price difference between zones is reduced or
completely eliminated? Lower electricity prices are an indication of a
more efﬁcient market. While in the short-run demand is inelastic, and
thus total welfare is invariant to price changes, in the long run this
does not occur, since the elasticity of demand is higher.
Expenditure reductions from interconnection are computedbasedon
a behavioral assumption on the dominant player in the market, Enel. A
natural assumption of market leader being a short-run proﬁt maximizer
need not be an appropriate one in the Italian case for a variety of reasons.
First, Enel is a partly State-owned ﬁrm. Second, electricity is a necessary
good, and hence the fear of regulatory intervention is strong if there is an
evidence of exploitation of market power. Finally, there is a potential
chance of entry if short-run proﬁts were too high.1 In other words,
dynamic considerations could lead a ﬁrm away from myopic proﬁt
maximization paradigm in the short run. Therefore we assume that
Enel's objective function has two portions. The ﬁrst one is the short-run
proﬁt maximization and the second one is the minimization of
consumers' expenditure. While the former represents the short-run
interest of Enel's private investors, the latter is a proxy both for Enel's
long run proﬁt considerations (prevention of regulatory retaliation and
entry), as well as the public ownership incentives (end-users' welfare).
We identify the relative weights of these two contrasting
objectives empirically. We ﬁnd that Enel places a weight of roughly
2/3 on its proﬁts and 1/3 on consumers' expenditure. Under the
assumption that the weights in the objective function of Enel do not
change due to interconnection, we ﬁnd that easing bottlenecks would
result in a saving of just over 10 million euros to the end-users of
electricity in the month of May 2004, the sample period considered
here. These savings account for almost 6% of spot market expenditure
in the congested hours of the corresponding time period. As we do not
have complete data on the costs of providing additional transmission
capacity, we characterize the cost savings alone. One interesting issue
is the question of optimal price differential. It is conceivable that the
total welfare gain (net of costs of increasing transfer capacity) might
be maximized at a point where prices are not always uniform across
zones. Though a policy maker is likely to install sufﬁcient transmission
capacity so that the problem of inadequate interconnection does not
reoccur in the near future, we also consider the expenditure savings
for end-users accruing with “less than full” interconnection (i.e.
completing resolving congestion only in a limited amount of hours).2
The industrial organization literature is rich in studies that
investigate various nuances of (de)regulation in electricity markets. In
a theoretical study, Borenstein et al. (2000) show thata small investment
in transmission capacity can substantially improve welfare. In their
analysis of Norwegian electricitymarkets, Johnsen et al. (2004) ﬁnd that
when the transmission capacity across zones binds, generators canmore
readily exercise market power. In this regard, the main objective of our
paper is to estimate the savings associated with congestion elimination.
Market imperfections – in the sense of market price distortion
(away from the ﬁrst best) – are well studied in the literature. The
empirical literature suggests that there is little correlation between
market concentration and the degree of market power exercised by
electricity generators. For example, Wolfram (1999) shows that the
mark ups in the England andWales electricity spot market in the early
1990s were lower than those implied by a Cournot duopoly model.
Sweeting (2007) shows that, in the second half of 1990s, ﬁrms in the1 Limit pricing as a reasonable strategy is discussed in Section 5.2.
2 We do not consider the ownership of the transmission network and assume that
the entire transmission network is under the control of a public authority. In 2004,
private investment in transmission network was banned in Italy. See Joskow and Tirole
(2005) for arguments against and Harvey et al. (1996) for arguments in favor of
merchant transmission.English electricity market exercised signiﬁcant market power “in spite
of decreasingmarket concentration”. Borenstein et al. (2002) ﬁnd that
the presence of market power doubled the wholesale electricity price
in the California's electricity market. Hortaçsu and Puller (2008) show
that large generators' bids in the Texasmarket support the assumption
of proﬁt maximization. Another contribution this paper makes is to
show that Enel does not exercise the fullest extent of itsmarket power.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the Italian electricity spot market. In Section 3 we present our
theoretical model. Section 4 discusses our dataset and presents some
summary statistics. In Section 5 we present our results along with
counterfactual simulations. Section 6 presents some extensions and
robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Italian electricity spot market
2.1. Market organization3
In 2004, Italian national electricity consumption was around 322
terawatt hours (TWh), an increase of about 0.4% from the previous year.
Hydrocarbons (coal, oil and natural gas) accounted for around seventy
ﬁve percent of the overall installed generation capacity. Hydroelectric
power plants accounted for around twenty ﬁve percent and other bio-
friendly generation plants (wind, photovoltaic, etc.) accounted for less
than 0.5% of the total production. Nuclear energy has been banned in
Italy since 1988.4 This ban, combined with a lack of any substantial
competition, is often blamed for Italy's high electricity prices.
Transactions in the Italian electricity market occur both through a
spot market and through individual bilateral contracts signed
between the generators and the end-users. The spot market is
designed to cater to the needs of the residential sector and all the
industrial customers that do not sign individual contracts. It also acts
as a buffer for any unanticipated short-term shocks to the demand,
and operates on an hourly basis.
Residential and industrial customers are subject to two different
sets of market rules. The residential sector is supplied through an
intermediary (single buyer), who operates via the spot market. It
accounted for more than 95% of the overall spot market quantity.
Residential consumers pay a tariff set by the Italian electricity
regulator (AEEG), ﬁxed throughout Italy irrespective of zone, and
subject to a quarterly review.5 Industrial spot market customers pay a
weighted average of previous month's spot market clearing prices,
irrespective of zone. Therefore the spot market demand can be safely
regarded as independent of that day's spot market clearing prices.
Hence, it is ﬁxed for spot market considerations.
For generators, nodal pricing is in place. That is, generators
participating in the spot market receive the market clearing price of
the zone in which they are located. TheMarket Operator (MO) solicits
bids from all generators each hour every day. A typical bid submitted
by a generator consists of at most fourteen price–quantity combina-
tions. A price–quantity combination is a commitment from the
generator of the amount of electricity he is willing to supply at that
price. The Transmission System Operator (TSO) announces the
maximum amount of electricity that can be transferred across
zones, which depends on several engineering criteria. The transmis-
sion network needs to undergo regular maintenance operations,
thereby frequently cramping the maximum amount of electricity thatIn some cases market rules have changed since then.
4 Roughly 60% and 15% of electricity consumption in France and Germany,
respectively, are produced by nuclear power plants. In the last months of 2008 the
Italian Government devised new plans to build nuclear power plants.
5 The electricity price paid by the residential sector is a politically sensitive issue.
Therefore, though in principle it is supposed to be set as a weighted average of all the
spot market clearing prices (with weights being quantities consumed), several
considerations play a role during the review.
Fig. 1. Derivation of a hypothetical demand curve for Enel.
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wide ﬂuctuations across various hours, even within a single day.
Given the location of the bidding generators, their supply curves,
the transmission constraint set by the TSO and the forecasted demand
in each zone, the MO solves the problem of optimal dispatch, whose
objective is to minimize total expenditure on electricity in the spot
market for a given electricity usage. The MO then determines the
market clearing price and quantities in each zone. All generators
whose submitted bids are below the market clearing price are invited
to generate the quantities they committed to in their bids.
The organization of bilateral contracts is straightforward. Con-
tracting parties negotiate a mutually agreeable price–quantity
schedule. A set of rules, representing no-arbitrage conditions, ensures
that spot and contract markets can coexist and neither of them
unravels.6 These contracts are private information (to the generator).
For the reasons explained in Section 4, we concentrate only on the
spot market. Therefore, in the rest of the analysis, the word “market”
refers to the spot market alone.
2.2. Zonal structure
Geographically, the Italian electricitymarket is divided into several
zones. Each zone identiﬁes a geographical area within which the grid
is almost perfect in the sense that congestion is rarely observed. The
regulator deﬁnes these zones and makes frequent changes to the
geographical boundaries of a zone either by joining two zones or by
separating an existing zone, depending on the amount of observed
congestion. In 2004, there were seven large zones, ﬁve in continental
Italy (North, Center-North, Center-South, South and Calabria) and one
each in the islands of Sardinia and Sicily.
In 2004, the most critical bottleneck occurred between North and
Center-North (separated 48% of all hours), while Center-North and
Center-South were seldom separated (around 4% of the hours) and
Center-South and South were never separated.
3. The baseline model
In the baseline model we consider a dominant ﬁrm, Enel, facing a
competitive fringe in each regional market if transmission congestion
takes place, and in the integrated market otherwise. In Section 6 and
in Appendix A we extend the analysis to the oligopoly case.
3.1. Model description
We consider themost critical bottleneck, occurring between North
and Centre-North. We thus divide the market into two zones, North
(above the bottleneck) and South (below the bottleneck). A Market
Operator (MO) coordinates the actions of the two zones, and demand
and supply conditions in the overall market. On the demand side, the
price is ﬁxed (and equal across zones) — hence the spot market
demand if fully inelastic. On the supply side, the structure is similar in
both zones. In each zone, there is a dominant ﬁrm, Enel, characterized
by a substantial market power. Besides, there exists a competitive
fringe in each zone. The assumption on the timing of the game is as
follows: every hour, the Market Operator predicts the quantity
demanded in the retail market and announces the same in the spot
market. There is an exogenously set transmission constraint, known
to all suppliers. This constraint deﬁnes the maximum amount of
electricity that can be transferred across zones in the market.7 The6 Each generator for every MWh sold through bilateral contracts has to pay
(receive) the difference, if positive (negative), between the average spot market price
and the zonal price.
7 We assume that the transfer is from North to South only. The rationale behind
such assumption is two-fold. First, electricity ﬂowing from South to North is never
recorded and second, the most efﬁcient generators are localized in the North.ﬁrms then place their bids consisting of price–quantity combinations.
These supply curves, alongwith demand and supply locations, and the
transmission network constraint, form the basis for the optimal
dispatch algorithm explained in the previous section.3.2. Behavior of the fringe
The competitive fringe consists of several ﬁrms, each of which, in
turn, comprises several plants with varying efﬁciency levels. We
assume that these plants produce their entire capacity whenever the
price is above marginal cost. The dominant ﬁrm, Enel, acts as a
residual demand monopolist. We assume that Enel estimates its own
demand function in the following way: it estimates the supply curve
of the fringe and subtracts it from the ﬁxed demand in each zone,
thereby calculating its downward sloping demand. This idea is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
As the spot market price increases, more fringe generators ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to employ more plants for electricity generation because
the price exceeds their marginal cost. Hence, the supply curve of the
fringe is upward sloping, as represented by the thick dashed line in
Fig. 1. The thin vertical line at Qspot represents the total electricity
demanded in the spot market. The residual demand curve, obtained
by subtracting the dashed line from the ﬁxed demand, is represented
by the thick downward sloping line in the picture.
For every hour each plant submits a menu of price–quantity
combinations (a supply curve). We use actual bids to characterize the
supply function of the fringe, thereby obtaining an estimate of the
slope of Enel's residual demand RD′. As the actual supply functions are
step functions comprising discrete price–quantity pairs, we follow
Wolak's (2003) and Hortaçsu and Puller's (2008) approach, and
smooth step functions using kernel functions. Furthermore, in
Section 6, we compare our results to those obtained by using linear
supply functions.88 The linear functional form for the supply curve simpliﬁes computations, and
guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium. Notwithstanding its limitations, it is
common in the electricity literature. See, for example, Green and Newbery (1992),
Bolle (1992) and Baldick and Hogan (2006).
Fig. 2. Enel's demand in the two zones. (a(b) South.
Fig. 3. Summation of fringe supply functions in the uniﬁed market.
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zone z, the quantity supplied at price P at a given hour h is given by:
Q fn;h = γn;h + βn;hPn;h ð1Þ
Q fs;h = γs;h + βs;hPs;h: ð2Þ
βz,h is the slope of the supply function of the fringe in zone z in
hour h, and consequently −βz,h is the slope of the residual demand
function faced by Enel.10
3.3. Behavior of Enel
It is not unreasonable to assume that Enel, after having observed
the fringe's behavior over several periods, would be able to estimate
Eq. (1) and (2).
We now characterize the demand faced by Enel under limited
interconnection between the markets.We call this regime (C). Say the9 Section 5 below clariﬁes that fringe supplies and residual demands are not linear,
but they both exhibit slopes that vary with P. In our computations, we will rely on
point estimates of ∂Qz,hf /∂Pz,h=βz,h evaluated at the market clearing prices.
10 For ease of exposition, we omit here and in the subsequent formulas the subscript
d relative to each day.maximum transfer capacity for hour h and day d is given by Td,h. This
demand function can be seen clearly in Fig. 2a and b.
In the case where the electricity market is uniﬁed, denoted by the
regime (UC), we assume that Enel is still the residual demand
monopolist, albeit now for the combined demand. Also, we have
separate fringes participating in the market. Total fringe supply is the
summation (across quantities) of both fringes. Fig. 3 depicts the
summation of the two fringe supplies, and Fig. 4 matches the
aggregate fringe supply with the residual demand faced by Enel in
the UC regime. As already mentioned, Enel might not behave like a
proﬁt-maximizing monopolist. Therefore the next task is to charac-
terize the objective function of Enel.
3.4. Objective function of Enel
As Enel's stock in 2004 was held jointly by the Italian Treasury
(around 40%) and private investors (the remainder), we assume that
its objective function is a convex combination of public incentive and
proﬁts. As the demand is inelastic, the consumer surplus theoretically
is inﬁnite. However, the change in consumer surplus is well deﬁned,
and we measure it by the change in the total expenditure onFig. 4. Deriving the demand for Enel in the uniﬁed market.
12 See also the thorough analysis of Kamat and Oren (2004) of oligopolistic electricity
markets under transmission constraints.
13 We thank an anonymous referee for having raised this point.
14 If our assumption were to affect the results, we would be underestimating Enel's
maximal attainable proﬁt, thereby attributing too high a weight to proﬁts and too low a
315F. Boffa et al. / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 28 (2010) 311–322electricity. Let α be the weight given to proﬁts. Then, the objective
function of Enel for a given hour h can be written as:
max
Pn;h ;Ps;h
∑
z=n;s
αz;h Pz;hQ
Enel
z;h −C Q
Enel
z;h
  
+ 1−αz;h
 
−Pz;hQ
spot
z;h
 h i
: ð3Þ
Qz,h
spot=Qz,hf +Qz,hEnel represents the overall quantity produced by
Enel and by the fringe in the spot market in zone z.
Observe that, in modeling Enel's objective function (3), we take
the bilateral (physical) contracts as given, thereby ignoring any proﬁts
from contracts. This does not hamper the identiﬁcation of α as long as
contracts market prices equal spot market prices (a no-arbitrage
condition that has to hold in expectations), and as long as Enel faces
the same incentives in trading off short-run proﬁts for reduced
consumer expenditure in the spot and in the contracts market.11
After having solved for the ﬁrst order conditions of Eq. (3), since
we have information on observed prices Pz,h and Enel's marginal costs,
and since we have estimates of βz,h, we can compute the weight on
proﬁt, αz,h, by equating the predicted prices from Eq. (3) with the
observed prices in the market. More precisely,
αz;h =
Q spotz;h
Q spotz;h + Pz;h
∂QEnelz;h
∂Pz;h
+ QEnelz;h −C′ðQEnelz;h Þ
∂QEnelz;h
∂Pz;h
ð4Þ
where
∂QEnelz;h
∂Pz;h
= −βz;h.
We let αz,h to be different for different periods and different zones.
Indeed, in a dynamic setup, Enel could potentially consider α to be a
variable, instead of a parameter. That is, by varying α strategically, one
could construct a situation where a better result for the end-users can
be achieved, while Enel's proﬁts over the time horizon considered are
the same (as in uniform α). However, the results presented in
Section 5 show that the computed α does not vary much across hours
(the standard deviation is only 0.04).
3.5. Evaluating counterfactual
To estimate the savings from interconnection, we need to estimate
the prices in the integrated market. For evaluating the counterfactual,
we make the following assumptions. As a result of improving the
transmission network: a) the behavior of the fringe does not change,
and b) the objective function of Enel does not change. We compute αh
in the integrated market as the weighted average of αn and αs.
αh =
αn;hQ
Enel
n;h + αs;hQ
Enel
s;h
QEneln;h + Q
Enel
s;h
ð5Þ
Therefore, the objective function in the integrated market is given by:
max
Ph
αh Ph Q
Enel
n;h + Q
Enel
s;h
 
−C QEneln;h + Q
Enel
s;h
 h i
+ 1−αhð Þ
× −Ph Q
spot
n;h + Q
spot
s;h
 h i
:
ð6Þ
From the ﬁrst order conditions, the quantity and the price in the
integrated market are as follows:
Ph =
ð1−αhÞQ spoth + αh C′ðQEnelh Þ ∂Q
Enel
h
∂Ph
−QEnelh
 
αh
∂QEnelh
∂Ph
ð7Þ
QEnelh =
Q spoth −αhðγn + γsÞ + αhC′ðQEnelh Þ ∂Q
Enel
h
∂Ph
2αh
ð8Þ11 In any event, we would not be able to analyze the contract market explicitly due to
a lack of data.where Qhspot=Qn,hspot+Qs,hspot, QhEnel=Qn,hEnel+Qs,hEnel, γn and γs are the
intercepts of the fringe supplies and ∂Q
Enel
h
∂Ph
= −ðβn + βsÞ is the slope
of Enel's residual demand in the integrated market. See Figs. 3 and 4.
3.6. On the treatment of congestion
As shown in Fig. 2a and b, the presence of transmission constraints
implies a shift of the residual demand for the two zones. In surveying the
approaches used to analyze the prospects for, and the impacts of, market
power in electricity, Borenstein et al. (1995, p. 229) point out that:
“Although there is no limit to the complexity of geographical separations
that can be caused by weak lines and congestion, two cases illustrate the
basic issues that can arise: (a) ﬂow on the congested line simply acts as a
shift in the demand at each end of the line, and (b) suppliers at each end
strategically respond to threats of competition from suppliers at the other
end”.12 In case (b), the presence of kinks in the residual demand would
generate non-concavities in the objective function (3). For example,
Borenstein et al. (2000), in a context of two geographically separated
electricity markets (each characterized by a monopoly or by a dominant
ﬁrm facing a competitive fringe) with limited transmission capacity,
showed that the strategic effect is such that even relatively small invest-
ments in transmission lines may be effective in spurring competition.
In our setting, Enel may have an incentive to saturate the transfer
capacity with the exclusive purpose of being able to price discriminate
across the two regions, while all the remaining strategic and cost
considerations would point to price uniformity.13 In such cases, capacity
saturation is achievedbydecreasingproduction in the Southwith respect
to what the other strategic and cost considerations would suggest.
Although congestion motivated by the attempts to generate price
dispersion is a potential outcome, we chose not to explicitly account for
it, and to consider ﬂows on the congested line as mere demand shifters
at each end of the line. While greatly simplifying the computations for
the determination ofα, by ruling out issues of non-convexity, our choice
is also due to two substantive reasons. First, differently from Borenstein
et al. (2000), in our case the same dominant ﬁrm, i.e., Enel, lies at both
ends of the congested line; therefore, the size of the transmission line
does not fundamentally alter the strategic features of the game, or the
nature of competition. Second, as Enel is facing a competitive fringe, its
cost of altering the congestion status by decreasing aggregate
production in the South increases (the required reduction in Enel's
production in the South is larger, as Enel's reduction is partly
compensated by production increases by the competitive fringe); as a
result, Enel's incentives towards this action are reduced.
Observe that, if anything, this assumption is conservative given the
main objective of the paper. If congestion induced solely by price
dispersion were to be a relevant strategy for Enel, the average α
would be overestimated. In other words, the real value of α would be
lower than what is being estimated in our model,14 and prices in the
‘but-for’ market would have been lower than those computed from
Eq. (7). Therefore, the gains due to interconnection are under-
estimated due to this assumption, and hence conservative.
4. Data
4.1. Data sources
The Italian electricity market data are collected from two sources.
The primary one is the Italian Electricity Market Website.15 Theweight toEnel's concerns for consumer'swelfare. As a result,αwouldbe overestimated, and
our results would place too much weight on Enel's proﬁt orientation.
15 http://www.mercatoelettrico.org/GmeWebInglese/Default.aspx.
Graph 1. Average hourly price difference (price in the South–price in the North). Note:
Calculated for 21 days in May 2004.
Source: Calculated from the data in the Italian Electricity Market website (http://
mercatoelettrico.org).
Graph 2. Zonal average hourly quantities. Note: Calculated for 21 days in May 2004.
Source: Calculated from the data in the Italian Electricity Market website (http://
mercatoelettrico.org).
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submitted bids one year from the time of market occurrence. The
information for each bid, plant and hour consists mainly of the price–
quantity pair, whether or not the bid has been accepted, and whether
or not it has been cancelled. The website also reports the hourly zonal
equilibrium price and quantity combinations. From these, we
compute hourly price differences in the market, and identify the
congested hours as those where prices differ across zones.
From the information on bids, it is straightforward to estimate the
supply function of the fringe ﬁrms for every hour and every zone
separately. The data on estimatedmarginal costs for all thermoelectric
(coal, oil or natural gas based) generating plants are provided by Re-
searches for Economics and Finance (REF).
4.2. Aggregation of zones
As previously mentioned, the Italian electricity market is divided
into seven large zones: North, Center-North, Center-South, South,
Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia. We ignore the islands of Sicily and
Sardinia for the analysis because they could be regarded as almost
separate markets at the time of the analysis. For computational
convenience, we further combine the remaining four zones into two
zones, North and South, based on geographical proximity and
frequency of bottleneck occurrences. The North zone consists of just
the North, while the South zone consists of Center-North, Center-
South, South and Calabria.
4.3. Choice of time period
Our analysis focuses on the month of May 2004. The choice of the
month is due to the fact that saturation in transmission capacity
occurs in May for 46% of the hours, a ﬁgure very close to the average
value for the year 2004, 48%. Since the question addressed in the
paper is estimating savings due to elimination of transmission
congestion, May could be regarded as a representative month in
terms of transmission line saturation.
Out of the thirty one days in May 2004, weekends account for ten
days. We ignore weekends for the purposes of this paper because the
demand is generally low, and hence the supply pattern of the fringe
could be different. Moreover, the transmission constraint does not
bind and hence prices are the same across zones. This information is
summarized in Table 1.
On average the highest price difference occurred in hour 20 (7 P.M. to
8 P.M.)while the smallest price disparity occurred inhour 5 (4A.M. to 5A.
M.).Quantity (Qspot) is always larger in theNorth, andpeakhours are11A.
M and 5 P.M. Sample characteristics are summarized in Graphs 1 and 2.
4.4. Analysis of bids
To estimate the supply curve of the fringe, we consider all the bids
presented by generators other than Enel. As mentioned earlier, Enel is
assumed to act as a residual demand monopolist. The reason for this
assumption is due to the market structure of power generators,
among which Enel had clearly signiﬁcant market power in 2004.
There are 13 ﬁrms other than Enel, but only Edison, Endesa, Enipower
and Tirreno Power have market shares beyond 2%. Ignoring the zones
of Sicily and Sardinia, Enel has 65% of the capacity (88% in the SouthTable 1
Sample characteristics.
Source: Calculated from the data in the Italian Electricity Market website (http://
mercatoelettrico.org).
Total days 31 Weekend days 10 Weekdaysa 21
Total hours
considered
504 Hours where prices
are the same
195 Hours where
prices differ
309
a No other holidays in this month.and 45% in the North). Moreover, only Edison is active with a market
share greater than 5% in either zone. While our baseline assumption is
that of a dominant ﬁrm with a competitive fringe in both zones, in
Section 6 we consider also an oligopoly structure, in which Edison is
assumed to behave strategically (and not like a fringe player).16
The admissible price set ranges from zero (negative bids are not
allowed) to 500 euros per megawatt hour (price cap). During certain
hours, generators may have an incentive to bid a price of zero for
strictly positive quantities. This zero price bid ensures that the
generator would be asked to produce in equilibrium, while receiving
the market clearing price. By assumption, a fringe generator is not
powerful enough to unilaterally inﬂuence market clearing prices.
Therefore, when a generator bids a zero price for a strictly positive
quantity, he merely ensures spot market participation and actually
obtains a strictly positive price.17
According to the model we propose, the estimated supply function
of the fringe reﬂects Enel's belief about the fringe ﬁrms' behavior.
Considering such extreme bids would bias the estimate of β.
Therefore, to avoid such a situation, we took the maximum and
minimum market clearing price for every hour and constructed a
“reasonable price” interval for every hour separately. The lower
(upper) bound of the interval was 25% below (25% above) the
minimum (maximum) price ever realized for that hour. If the lower
bound is below zero, we set it equal to zero. The maximum and the
minimum prices realized every hour are given in Graph 3. Out of the
remaining bids, we ignore those with a zero bid price.16 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting us this analysis.
17 If a generator has substantial commitments in the contract markets for the next
hour with none at a given hour, he might ﬁnd it optimal to ensure spot market
participation in that hour. Signiﬁcant startup costs suggest that shutting down the
plant for that hour is not an economically viable option. From some informal
discussions with a few fringe generators, it was evident that they have a fairly good
idea of the interval in which market clearing price will be realized.
Graph 4. Enel's marginal costs for North and South.
Source: Proprietary dataset from REF.
Graph 3. Maximum and minimum realized prices.
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Most generators are multi-plant ﬁrms. Based on the location of the
plant, its production process and the inputs required for electricity
generation, marginal costs for each plant may be accurately computed
using engineering data. In such computations, it is assumed that the
marginal cost of any given plant is constant. Since each plant has a
speciﬁc efﬁciency level, the marginal cost of a generator is a weakly
increasing function, i.e., a step function. REF provides us with
engineering estimates of the marginal costs of every thermoelectric
plant of Enel and of fringe suppliers. Graph 4 shows the marginal cost
of Enel's thermoelectric plants.18
4.6. Bilateral contracts versus the spot market
In this paper we only consider the spot market and not the contracts
market. The data on the contracts market are proprietary and unavailable
to us. Bilateral contracts form a signiﬁcant portion of electricity
consumption in Italy. The details of the amount of electricity transacted
in the spot market as a fraction of overall consumption, termed as
liquidity, are presented in Graph 5. On average, liquidity is around 30%.
The Italian contracts aremostlybilateral physical contracts andnot just
the ﬁnancial instruments (hedge contracts) previously addressed in the
literature (seeWolak, 2000). A retailer/generatorwhosigns the contract is
expected to physically deliver electricity to the consumer involved in the
contract at a pre-determined and mutually agreed price.19 From the few
contracts we have obtained, the price agreed upon is often a weighted
average of the previousmonth's spotmarket clearing price (implying that
in expectations consumers are indifferent between contracts and spot
markets). Therefore, assuming this as a general rule, our estimate of
expenditure reduction triggered by interconnection is conservative.
The contract market plays a role in determining the ‘marginal
plant’ Enel uses for production in the spot market. As honoring
bilateral contracts is mandatory, while participation in the spot
market is not, any given generator uses its most efﬁcient plants to
supply the contract market. Therefore it becomes crucial to determine
the marginal plant, i.e., the most efﬁcient plant employed in the spot
market. The method with which we identify the marginal plant in the
unintegrated regime is as follows.Wemanually identify, using data on
bids and marginal cost, the most efﬁcient of Enel's plants that
participated in the spot market for every hour and every zone, and we
labeled it the marginal plant for that hour for that zone. We also
assume that all plants whose marginal cost is below the marginal
plant participate exclusively in the contracts markets. Further, the18 Excluding Sicily and Sardinia, we considered 70 thermoelectric plants owned by
Enel (45 in the North and 25 in the South). The step cost functions for the other
generators are similar. For example, Edison has 19 plants of which 12 are localized in
the North. Edison's marginal costs range from 27 to 50.4 euros (the latter are attained
at an aggregate capacity of 4454 MWh).
19 The Italian law forbids generators from signing bilateral contracts directly. These
generators operate in long-term contracts market via afﬁliated retailers.marginal plant and all those with higher marginal cost bid exclusively
in the spot market.
In order to determine themarginal plant in the uniﬁedmarket (i.e.,
the counterfactual), we assume that the market share of Enel in the
contracts market is equal to its share in the spot market. This
assumption allows us to roughly predict the amount of electricity that
needs to be generated by Enel for the contract market. By arranging
Enel's plants in decreasing order of efﬁciency (increasing order of
marginal cost), it is straightforward to identify the marginal plant
under the assumption that themost efﬁcient plant(s) participate(s) in
the contract market. The identiﬁcation of marginal plants comes at a
cost. The method described above implicitly assumes there are no
plant shut-downs and start up costs. It also fails to take into account
any network imperfections within a zone. Therefore, our predicted
expenditure savings could be overstated.
5. Results
5.1. Supply functions of the fringes
As discussed in Section 3, we follow Wolak (2003) and Hortaçsu
and Puller (2008) and smooth step functions in the data using a
nonparametric (Kernel density) regression estimation to estimate
βnorth,h and βsouth,h and consequently to obtain the slope of the
residual demand function RD′.
Let the fringe supply function for zone z for hour h be represented
by the pairs {(P1, Q1)…, (Pn, Qn)}. The smoothed version of this
function will be
Qf = ∑
n
i=1
QiK
P−Pi
θ
 
ð9ÞGraph 5. Hourly average liquidity.
Source: www.mercatoelettrico.it.
Table 2
Characteristics of αz,h.
αn,h αs,h
Min 0.57 0.54
Max 0.98 0.73
Median 0.68 0.62
Average 0.69 0.63
Standard Deviation 0.07 0.04
αz,h
Simple average 0.66
Standard Deviation 0.06
αh
Weighted average 0.66
Standard Deviation 0.04
Weights given by Enel's spot market production for the hour.
Note: Calculated for all hours where price difference is non-zero.
Graph 6. Estimated β'sa. aAverage values of βn,h and βs,h computed from Eq. (10)
evaluated at the market clearing prices Pz,h.
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parameter. The derivative of the supply function is given by:
Qf
′ðPÞ = ∂Q
f
∂P = ∑
n
i=1
Qi
1
θ
K ′
P−Pi
θ
 
: ð10Þ
∂Qf
∂Pf is an estimate of the slope βz,h of the fringe's supply function inzone z in hour h which clearly varies with P. Since we need a point
estimate of βz,h for each zone/hour/day triplet, we evaluated Eq. (10)
at the market clearing prices.
Graph 6 presents the average values for βn,h and βs,h for every hour
across all days.20 Since data inspection indicates that the fringe has a
larger presence in the North than in the South, one should ﬁnd Enel to
be more responsive to prices in the North than in the South. Graph 6
clearly shows that, as expected, the slopes of the fringe supply in the
North are larger than in the South for all hours.
5.2. Enel's objective function
Before simulating the market under the alternative market regime
of no transmission constraint, we characterize the objective function
of Enel as described in Section 3. Enel places a weight α on proﬁt and
1−α on consumer welfare. We compute α for every hour by equating
observed prices in both zones with the prices predicted from the ﬁrst
order conditions of the objective function (3).We compute the overall
α in the integrated market as a weighted average of αn and αs.
Characteristics of computed α are presented in Table 2. On average α
takes the value 0.66 with a low standard deviation of 0.04. Such
results are comforting, taking into account the fact that in 2004
around 60% of Enelwas owned by private investors and around 40% by
the Italian treasury. The weight on proﬁts is higher in the North and
lower in the South.
Given Enel's estimated relative weights on proﬁt and on consumer
surplus (reﬂecting its actual relative concerns on the two compo-
nents), their heterogeneous distribution across zones may be
consistent with strategies aimed both at deterring prospective entry
through limit pricing, and at appeasing the regulator, probably for fear
that a relevant price difference may be perceived as the result of
market power exploitation, and thus may lead to regulatory
retaliation.21 In fact data suggest that Enel aligns (by selecting an
appropriate pair of αn and αs) the prices between the North and the20 Weused a total of 22,403 actual bids (19,208 placed in theNorth and3195 placed in the
South). The minimum number of observations is 45 (hour 5 in South) and the maximum
number of observations is 1273 (hour 22 in North). See Boffa and Pingali (2006) for further
details. We used a normal kernel density and the smoothing parameter θ=1.
21 A political economy story, according to which Enel's behavior reﬂects an incentive
to favor Southern consumers and ﬁrms, can be dismissed if one considers that the
price consumers pay is invariant across zones (it is a weighted average of zonal prices
received by the producers in the various zones).South, probably for one of the two above mentioned reasons.22
Observe that, given the speciﬁc nature of Enel's objective function, it
may well be that α represents a credible commitment and therefore
limit pricing could be a viable strategy.23
5.3. Simulations in the alternative market
After characterizing the objective function of Enel, we simulate the
market under the alternative market structure of no transmission
congestion.
We employ an iterative procedure to obtain the equilibrium in the
integrated market regime. First, we identify the marginal plant in the
interconnected market using the method discussed in Section 4.6.
Then, we order Enel's plants that participate in the spot market in a
decreasing order of efﬁciency. Later, we calculate the objective
function-maximizing output for the most efﬁcient plant ignoring the
plant's generation capacity constraint. If that output is feasible (i.e.
lower than the plant's generation capacity), it is the equilibrium
quantity. Otherwise, we consider the two most efﬁcient plants and
reiterate the process.
We present simulated prices and quantities in Graphs 7 and 8
respectively. Hourly average prices in the integrated market are well
below the average prices in the South and are very close to the prices
in the North. In other words, while North almost maintains its status
quo (with small price increases), South is beneﬁted substantially with
lower prices in regime UC. Graph 8a) shows that, under the C regime,
on average, 1396 MWhs of electricity are transferred, and transfers
represent on average 16% of total spot market production (47% of
average production in the South). Graph 8b) shows that in the
integrated market (UC regime) the quantity produced by Enel slightly
increases at the expense of the production of the competitive fringe.
Transfers increase as well, especially in the last 6 h. Enel's market
share increases from 56.5% to 57.3%, and transfers increase on average
by 51 MWhs (+6%). Themaximum increase in transfers is 446 MWhs
(+50%).
The simulation results indicate that market integration signiﬁcantly
reduces consumer expenditures. The overall expenditure reduction is
above tenmillion euros forMay 2004. Under the assumption thatMay is22 To bemore speciﬁc, this “redistribution” across zones does not affect consumers (who
pay anyway an average price irrespective of the zone in which they are located), and
becomes irrelevant in the integrated market. However, as long as the market remains
unintegrated, a low alpha in a certain region may be reﬂective of other concerns (such as
limit pricing or appeasing the regulator by aligning the prices in the two zones).
23 The usual argument that under observability of marginal cost limit pricing is not
credible, should not apply in this environment due to the concerns for consumer surplus.
Graph 9. Hourly average savings. Note: Calculated for all hours where price difference
between zones is not zero.
Graph 8. Simulated versus actual quantities. Note: Calculated for all hours where prices
in the North and the South are different.
Graph 7. Simulated versus actual prices. Note: Calculated for all hours where prices in
the North and the South are different.
25 As discussed in Section 3.6, we ignore Enel's strategies involving transfer
saturations that occur for the pure incentive towards price dispersion. As compared
to the actually observed ones, prices increase in the North and reduce in the South but,
as reported in the second column of Table 3, due to the relatively more efﬁcient use of
generating plants in the North, the net effect points towards the presence of cost
savings.
26 Therefore, keeping into account the additional fact that more than one month of
data on bids, observed prices and quantities would be required, a full cost beneﬁt
analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper.
27 To that respect, our data show that there were hours where Enel's plants in the
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be over 120 million euros for 2004. Savings from interconnection are
summarized inGraph 9. Themaximumgain for end-users is observed in
hour 22 (9 PM to 10 PM) on 31 May 2004.
While, as discussed in Section 3.6, we do not introduce any
strategic considerations à la Borenstein et al. (2000), we ﬁnd results
that are consistent with the “thin line” argument: considerable
savings can be attained also under partial interconnection (i.e. when
the transmission capacity is increased by less than 446 MWhs), due to
the increased scope for utilization of the most efﬁcient generating
plants.24 The last column of Table 3 shows that savings from
interconnection do not increase linearly with the addition of
transmission capacity: a 50 Mwh transmission line leads to a
5 millions savings, an increase of 150 MWhs is sufﬁcient to obtain
savings equal to 8.5 million euros, andmost of the savings (91%) can be
obtained by allowing an extra 200 MWhs to ﬂow across the two
regions. In particular, the third column reports the cost savings that
can be attained in the hours in which the new transmission capacity is24 We thank an anonymous referee for having raised this issue.enough to completely resolve congestion, while the second column
reports the cost savings for the remaining hours hc for which the
investment is not sufﬁcient to fully remove the bottleneck, so that the
two markets remain geographically separated. For such hours, using
theweightsαz,h on proﬁts computed in Section 5.2, we employ theﬁrst
order condition of Eq. (3) and solve Eq. (4) to simulate the prices Pn,hc
and Ps,hc that would prevail under zonal pricing. In so doing, we
increase Qn,hcspot by the amount of the investment in new transmission
capacity ΔTh, and we reduce Qs,hcspot accordingly (see Fig. 2a and b).255.4. Overall effects of integration
In this paper we focus our attention on the variation of consumer
surplus. In order to develop a full welfare analysis one should be able
to include the change in producers' surpluses, the cost of building
additional transmission capacity, as well as environmental costs and
the opportunity costs incurred due to possible disturbances to the
existing transmission network.26
As to the costs of increasing interconnection, in 2004, the owner of
the Italian infrastructure responsible for interconnection – Terna –
estimated that it would cost around four hundred thousand euros of
labor and material cost per kilometer of interconnection. Though the
actual bottleneck occurs only for around one hundred kilometers, and
hence the cost would be forty million euros, an improved inter-zonal
transmission network also requires a more efﬁcient intra-zonal
transmission mechanism, the cost of which we have no data on. On
the other hand, the “thin line” argument developed above could imply
that, after an appropriate and thorough cost to beneﬁt analysis, the
optimal solution could prescribe a partial increase in the transmission
capacity.
By including the producers' surplus into the analysis, one can
notice that in the short run the net welfare change is driven by the
reduction in production costs after eliminating congestion,27 while
expenditure reduction is primarily due to a transfer from producers to
consumers. However, the decline in total expenditure triggered by
interconnection uncontroversially leads to a welfare improvement inNorth with marginal cost less than twenty seven euros were idle, while in the South
plants with marginal cost more than forty euros were in operation. Therefore Enel has
a chance to reorganize its production plans and reduce its total costs. But this is
accomplished at the expense of fringe suppliers' proﬁts.
Table 4
Comparison across estimation methods.
Kernel Random effects Fixed effects
Average βa in North 21.25 22.52 22.64
Average βa in South 5.41 5.90 5.90
Average α in North 0.693 0.690 0.700
Average α in South 0.629 0.627 0.627
Price with interconnection (euro/MWh) 51.04 51.55 50.04
Savings from interconnection for
May 2004 (million euro)
10.28 9.09 10.93
a Average values across the 24 h.
Table 3
Interconnection gains and transmission capacity.
Increase in
transmission
ΔTh (MWhs)
Expenditure savings
for (still) congested
hours (euro)
Expenditure savings
from full
interconnection (euro)
Total expenditure
savings from
interconnection (euro)
50 321,606 4,737,454 5,059,060
100 414,185 6,349,456 6,763,641
150 259,721 8,252,475 8,512,196
200 130,148 9,303,145 9,433,293
300 127,134 9,474,095 9,601,229
446 – 10,275,532 10,275,532
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emergence of potential substitution patterns.28
6. Robustness and extensions
In this section we test the robustness of our results to alternative
estimation methods for β's and, most importantly, to an alternative
(oligopolistic) hypothesis about the market structure.
6.1. Linear fringe supply functions
Instead of following the step function approach, one can simply
assume that the supply curve is linear. While this assumption is
clearly restrictive, it simpliﬁes computations, and guarantees the
existence of a unique equilibrium.
Eqs. (1) and (2) are now represented by
Q fn;dh = γn;h + βn;hPn;dh + θn;d + εn;dh ð11Þ
Q fs;dh = γs;h + βs;hPs;dh + θs;d + εs;dh ð12Þ
where θz,d indicates day ﬁxed effects, and εz,dh is the idiosyncratic
error for zone z. Eqs. (11) and (12) have been estimated by using ﬁxed
effects (FE) and random effects (RE).29
The results of various estimation methods, and the comparisons
with the Kernel Density Regression Estimation are presented in
Table 4. Estimated α's are very similar, while estimated β's are lower
for the Kernel Regression in both zones. Prices in the interconnected
market range from 50 to 51.6 and savings from interconnections
range from 9.1 to 10.9 million euros.30
6.2. Oligopoly structure
In the baseline model, Enel is assumed to be the only ﬁrm with
market power. In this subsection we extend our analysis to the
oligopoly case. Borenstein et al. (2000) modelled the California's
electricity market at the time of deregulation, early in 1998, as divided
in two distinct regional markets. In each zone a dominant ﬁrm (Paciﬁc
Gas & Electric with a 60% market share in the region North of the Path28 Notice also that, given the form of its objective function, Enel takes advantage from
a reduction in consumer expenditure triggered by the additional interconnection, and
might therefore have an incentive to invest in new transmission capacity.
29 As there are several factors that could inﬂuence the fringe ﬁrms' bids on a given
day, it is likely that their bidding pattern is different across days. Any supply function
estimation that does not take into account such differences — as in the case of OLS
estimation — is likely to create a bias in the estimates of the slope parameters.
30 For more details on the estimation of a linear fringe supply, see Boffa and Pingali
(2006), who also considered the empirical shortcut of estimating a linear marginal
cost function for Enel. Finally, we also tried to estimate the fringe supplies by using
data on observed quantities and market clearing prices, i.e. without using actual bids
(see Bushnell et al., 2008, who have tested different functional forms). Results are
qualitatively similar, but the implied reduced variability of point estimates of the
residual demands slopes yields a 10%–15% reduction in cost savings due to
interconnection.15 transmission constraint and Southern California Edisonwith 45% in
the Southern region) was facing a competitive fringe.31 In a recent
work, Puller (2007) modelled the Californian electricity market in the
post-divestiture years (1998–2000) as a uniﬁed market with the 5
largest ﬁrms32 acting as strategic players and the remaining ones as
part of the competitive fringe.
The Italian market structure in 2004 resembles closely to the
Californian one at the time of deregulation, with the substantial
exception that the dominant player is Enel in both regional markets
(88% of capacity in the South and 45% in the North). This is why we
believe in a monopolistic industry structure, which we analyse in our
baseline model. However, we have also explored the implications of
an alternative assumption involving a duopolistic structure. In this
model, Enel and Edison play a Cournot game facing a competitive
fringe in both zones as well as in the integrated market.33 The details
of the model are reported in Appendix A.
At ﬁrst, we estimated a new fringe supply that excludes Edison's
bids34 and thus obtain the new slopes of the residual demand function
∂Qr
z;h
∂Pz;h
= −β′z;h
 
. Second, from the ﬁrst order conditions for the Cournot
model we estimate the new weight αz,h′ attributed to proﬁts in Enel's
objective function.
α′z;h =
Q spotz;h
γ′z;h + Q
Edison
z;h + 2Q
Enel
z;h −C′ðQEnelz;h Þ
∂Qrz;h
∂Pz;h
ð13Þ
From the ﬁrst order condition for Edison, its best response function
obtains:
QEdisonz;h =
Q spotz;h −Q
Enel
z;h −γ′z;h−C′ðQEdisonz;h Þβ′z;h
2
: ð14Þ
Eq. (14) can be used to obtain simulated values of Qz,hEdison to be
compared with the observed actual quantities in order to verify the
plausibility of the duopoly assumption.
In the integrated market, assuming an average value of α′, and
solving for the optimal quantities of QhEnel and QhEdison, it is possible to
estimate the prevailing price as follows:
Ph =
ð1−αhÞQ spoth + αh ½C′ðQEnelh Þ + C′ðQEdisonh Þ ∂Q
r
h
∂Ph
−ðQEnelh + QEdisonh Þ
 
2αh
∂Qrh
∂Ph
ð15Þ31 Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) developed a simulation model which included
also San Diego Gas & Electric as a further strategic player in a uniﬁed (i.e. by assuming
the absence of transmission constraints) model of the California's electricity market.
32 AES, Reliant, Duke, Southern and Dynegy were broadly of the same size and were
responsible for 50% of the total generation capacity.
33 Still excluding Sicily and Sardinia, Edison market share was 21% in the North and
5% in the South (13.5% overall), while the third biggest player, Endesa was operating
only in the North with a market share of 17% (9% in the whole market). All the other
players (among which Enipower and Tirreno) had market shares below 5%.
34 The total number of observations is now 17,803 (15,094 bids placed in the North
and 2709 bids placed in the South).
Table 5
Actual ﬁgures versus oligopoly simulations.
Prices Consumer
expenditure
(million euro)
North South Integrated market
Actual data
Actual prices (euro/MWh) 51.44 56.57 – 166.6
Simulated data
Dominant ﬁrm in
integrated market
– – 51.04 156.3
Duopoly with fringe
in both zones
47.59 54.02 – 147.8
Duopoly with fringe
in integrated market
– – 47.39 141.4
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r
h
∂Ph
= −ðβ′north + β′southÞ is the slope of the residual demand in
the integrated market.
The estimated values of α′n,h and α′s,h turn out to be on average
slightly higher as compared to the baseline model (0.698 and 0.631,
respectively). This is consistent with the intuition that, given the
observed prices Pz,h, in a more competitive environment Enel should
put more weight on proﬁts.
Table 5 shows that in the integrated market the price would fall
down to 47.39, and the total consumer expenditure would reduce
from 166.6 to 141.4 million euro, implying a total saving of 25 million
euros. The oligopoly model, however, is an accurate representation
of reality only if the actual market data prove to be compatible with
the model prediction. In fact, by comparing the estimated values
of Qz,hEdison resulting from Eq. (14) to the actual values produced by
Edison, we record large differences, especially in the hours with low
demand (during the night and early in themorning). Also, the average
differences between the actual supply of Enel and estimated values of
Qz,h
Enel are higher with respect to the baseline case.
An alternative intuition for this is provided by looking at Eq. (19)
in Appendix A. By considering the estimated values of Q z,hEdison and
Qz,h
Enel, it is possible to estimate the prices that would prevail in an
oligopoly setting and compare them to the actually observed ones.
Our results show that observed prices in the two zones are rather
different than the expected ones (47.59 euros in the North and 54.02
euros in the South). The simulated total expenditure is 147.8 million
euros (smaller than the actual expenditure of 166.6 million euros),
and the savings due to interconnection are 6.4 million euros.
These ﬁgures are reported in Table 5, which compares the results
of our baseline model (the ﬁrst two rows) with those stemming from
the duopoly simulation (last two rows).
Observe that the reduction of consumer expenditures under full
interconnection is higher (10.3 million euros) if the starting point is a
market structure with a dominant ﬁrm and a competitive fringe than
under a duopoly facing a competitive fringe (6.4 million euros). A
possible intuition for the result is that the beneﬁts from Enel's plants
reshufﬂing are harder to achieve under the additional constraint
imposed by Edison's strategic behavior.
7. Conclusion
The paper analyzes the beneﬁts for end-users associated with
eliminating transmission bottlenecks across zones in the Italian
electricity spot market.
The simulation of such beneﬁts requires knowledge of the
objective function of Enel, the major generator in the market. There
are many reasons to believe that mere short-run proﬁt maximization
does not apply to Enel. Our results conﬁrm that the expenditure
minimization is a signiﬁcant component of Enel's objective function.
In particular, we ﬁnd that Enel associates a weight of 66% to short-run
proﬁts and the remaining 34% to expenditure minimization. Theincentives towards expenditure minimization may stem either from
long-run proﬁt considerations (related to the need to prevent
regulatory retaliation and entry), or from State ownership and
orientation to consumer surplus. Under the assumption that these
weights do not change after the elimination of the transfer
constraints, we ﬁnd that the total expenditure savings to the end-
users under the complete elimination of transmission bottlenecks
would be more than ten million euros in the month of May 2004, our
sample period. These savings are driven by the reshufﬂing of
production across plants by Enel, that in the interconnected market
can better exploit the most efﬁcient generation units in the North, as
well as by a transfer from producers to end-users. Since May can be
regarded as a representative month in terms of the saturation
occurrence rate, we may speculate that yearly expenditure saving to
end-users in the spot market would amount to more than 120 million
euros. There are reasons to believe that a no-arbitrage condition
would ensure that the contracts market would – at least partially –
match the spot market in terms of price reduction.
Moreover, our analysis shows that savings are not a linear function
of the size of new transmission lines. Even a relatively small increase
in the interconnection capacity – a thin line – can be effective in
reducing prices and bringing beneﬁts to electricity consumers.
Such results are based on the assumption that Enel is a dominant
player that faces a competitive fringe in both zones.Wealso extendour
analysis to include the possibility that the second largest producer on
the Italian spot electricity market, Edison, is a strategic player, and ﬁnd
that the observed prices do not support the duopoly assumption.
While data constraints prevent us from developing a full welfare
analysis, our results show that improving market interconnection is
substantially increasing consumer surplus in the short run (when
electricity demand is rigid), and is very likely to have important total
welfare effects in the long run (when demand is elastic and price
reductions per se display an efﬁciency-enhancing effect beyond the
mere transfer from producers to consumers).
Appendix A. Oligopoly structure
Differently from the baseline model, in which a dominant ﬁrm
faces a competitive fringe in both zones, we consider now the case of
two asymmetric ﬁrms, Enel and Edison, facing the residual demand by
playing a quantity game. In the separated markets case, Enel's
objective function is
max
Qn;h ;Qs;h
∑
z=n;s
αz;h Pz;hQ
Enel
z;h −C Q
Enel
z;h
  
+ 1−αz;h
 
−Pz;hQ
spot
z;h
 h i
ð16Þ
and the residual demand function (denoted with Qz,hr) faced by the
two oligopolists after subtracting the fringe production is:
Qrz;h = Q
Enel
z;h + Q
Edison
z;h = Q
spot
z;h −Q
f
z;h = Q
spot
z;h −γ′z;h−β′z;hPz;h
whereγz,h′ is the intercept andβz,h′ is the slope of the fringe supply in zone
z in hourh. After having estimated the supply functions of the fringe, from
the ﬁrst order conditions of Enel it is possible to compute αz,h′ :
α′z;h =
Q spotz;h
γ′z;h + Q
Edison
z;h + 2Q
Enel
z;h −C′ðQEnelz;h Þ
∂Qrz;h
∂Pz;h
ð17Þ
where ∂Q
r
z;h
∂Pz;h
= −β′z;h is the slope of the residual demand function. The
objective function of the small oligopolist Edison is:
max
Qn;h ;Qs;h
∑
z=n;s
ðPz;hQEdisonz;h −CðQEdisonz;h ÞÞ: ð18Þ
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Pz;h =
Q spotz;h −Q
Enel
z;h −QEdisonz;h −γ′z;h
β′z;h
ð19Þ
the best response function for Edison turns out to be:
QEdisonz;h =
Q spotz;h −Q
Enel
z;h −γ′z;h−C′ðQEdisonz;h Þβ′z;h
2
: ð20Þ
In the integrated market, the fringe supply and the residual
demand result from the summation of the two zonal fringes and
residual demands, respectively. Assuming that α′ in the integrated
market is the weighted average of αn,h′ and αs,h′ , Enel's and Edison's
objective functions are given by
max
QEnel
h
αh PhQ
Enel
h −C Q
Enel
h
 h i
− 1−αhð ÞPhQ spoth ð21Þ
max
QEdison
h
PhQ
Edison
h −C Q
Edison
h
 
ð22Þ
where Ph is Ph =
Q spot
h
−QEnelh −Q
Edison
h −γ
′
north−γ
′
south
β′n + β′s
and Qhspot =Q n,hspot+Q s,hspot,
Qh
Enel=Qn,hEnel+Qs,hEnel, QhEdison=Qn,hEdison+Qs,hEdison.
From the ﬁrst order conditions we obtain the best response
functions and the corresponding optimal quantities and equilibrium
prices:
Ph =
ð1−αhÞQ spoth + αh ½C′ðQEnelh Þ + C′ðQEdisonh Þ ∂Q
r
h
∂Ph
−ðQEnelh + QEdisonh Þ
 
2αh
∂Qrh
∂Ph
ð23Þ
QEnelh =
ð2−αhÞQ spoth −αhðγ′n + γ′s Þ + αh ∂Q
r
h
∂Ph
2C′ QEnelh
 
−C′ QEdisonh
 h i
3αh
ð24Þ
QEdisonh =
ð2αh−1ÞQ spoth −αhðγ′n + γ′s Þ + αh ∂Q
r
h
∂Ph
2C′ QEdisonh
 
−C′ QEnelh
 h i
3αh
ð25Þwhere γn′ and γs′ are the intercepts of the fringe supplies and
∂Qrh
∂Ph
is the
slope of the residual demand in the integrated market (that is
∂Qrh
∂Ph
= −ðβ′n + β′s Þ).References
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